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TRUST TERMINATION AND UNBORN BENEFICIARIES
In dealing with trusts courts are reluctant to deprive bene-
ficiaries of their interests by terminating the trust agreement except
where the beneficiaries, by giving their consent, have shown a desire
for such termination. When all the beneficiaries consent, a court
generally allows termination of the trust before the fulfillment of
its purpose, because there is no compelling reason to perpetuate a
trust after all persons beneficially interested have agreed to its term-
ination.1 Nevertheless termination poses problems for the settlor
of a trust limited to himself for life with a remainder over to his
issue or to his heirs.2 The settlor may be able to obtain the consent
of those potential heirs who are living at the time of the proposed
termination, but the consent of the possible beneficiaries who are
yet unborn (or unascertained) at that time is also required.3 This
seems to be a harsh result for a settlor who has set up the trust
mainly for himself during his lifetime and who now desires, perhaps
for need of extra income, to terminate the trust and recapture the
corpus. Realizing the harshness of this result, but at the same time
recognizing the basic rule that decrees and judgments are not bind-
ing on those interested parties who are not before the court,4 courts
have sought ways to ascertain the rights and affect the interests of
the unborn.
I. VmTUAL REPRESENTATION
One method courts have used to manipulate the interests of
the unborn is that of virtual representation.5 Under this doctrine
I RTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF TRUSTS § 338 (1959); IV A. Scorr, TnE LAW OF TRusrs
§ 338 (3rd ed. 1967); G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusrEEs §§ 1007-1008 (2d ed. 196-2).
2 A remainder limited to the heirs of the settlor in many states invokes the doc-
trine known as worthier title. This article does not discuss the application of that
doctrine. For discussions of worthier title and its use in the modification or termina-
tion of trusts see 66 COLUm. L. REv. 1552 (1966); 42 NOTRE DAu.a LAw. 542 (1967);
28 Omo ST. L.J. 166 (1967); 42 WAsH. L. REV. 919 (1967). Note also that these articles
deal with the irrevocable trust.
3 Leonardini v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 131 Cal. App. 2d 9, 280
P.2d 81 (1955).
4 This is probably one of the oldest principles of law. Mason v. Eldred, 73 U.S.
231 (1867).
5 Gunnell v. Palmer, 370 I1. 206, 18 N.E.2d 202 (1938); In re Campbell's Estate,
46 Hawaii 475, 382 P.2d 920 (1963); Peoples Nat'1 Bank v. Barlow, 235 S.C. 488,
112 S.E.2d 396 (1960); L. Si.cms AND A. ShirrH, Tan LAw or Furuaz IN7Ezazs § 1803
(2d ed. 1956); REsTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 182-185 (1936); Roberts, Virtual Repre-
sentation in Actions Affecting Future Interests, 30 Ir.r.. L. Rrv. 580 (193).
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the unborn are represented by the living beneficiaries, or more
formally, the unborn may be bound by the living representatives
of the same class or by those who have interests so similar as to ef-
fectively protect the interests of the unborn. Virtual representation
is not a new doctrine and has been applied in many situations, such
as suits to quiet title, partition suits, and proceedings to sell land
affected with a future interest. Like the appointment of the guardian
ad litem, discussed below, it is a rule of convenience designed to
avoid waiting for the possible birth of new claimants, which could
mean waiting for another generation.
Virtual representation may operate in either of two ways. Mem-
bers of a class of beneficiaries who are alive may represent the un-
born members of the same class in litigation because of the similar-
ity of their estates. 6 For example, A, the settlor, limits certain prop-
erty to himself for life with a remainder to his children. At the
time A wishes to terminate the trust, he has two children; but, as
courts have said, the possibility of issue is never extinct. The un-
born in this case may be represented by the living children of A,
and a decree or judgment against them would be binding.
In some jurisdictions the question has arisen whether, in order
for a court to have jurisdiction to affect the rights of unborn parties,
the representatives must be of the same class as the unborn whom
they represent.7 In other words, the question is whether issue must
represent issue, both being entitled to the same interest, or whether
any living beneficiaries may represent unborn beneficiaries of a like
interest, regardless of similarity of class. This problem particularly
arises when there is no person alive of the same class as the possible
unborn beneficiary. For example, in a trust set up by A with income
for life to B, remainder to the children of B, what happens if B
wishes to terminate but at the time has no children? Can there be
any representation of, and therefore binding decree upon, the un-
born? The majority view seems to be
that the doctrine of representation must have the flexibility
born of convenience and necessity, and that if the interests of
unborn contingent remaindermen are sufficiently represented
6 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 184 (d) (1936); Roberts, supra note 5, at 582;
Comment, California Procedures for Obtaining Judicial Decrees Binding on Unborn
or Unascertained Persons, 5 HASTINGS L.J. 199 (1954).
7 Gunnell v. Palmer, 370 Ill. 206, 18 N.E2d 202 (1938); Peoples Nat'l Bank v.
Barlow, 235 S.C. 488, 112 S.E2d 396 (1960).
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so they can be protected by the court, the prerequisites for ap-
plication of the doctrine are satisfied.8
Thus where there are no living members of the same class the un-
born may still be represented, perhaps by persons whose estates pre-
cede or follow those of the unborn.
The idea of having representation by members of a class dif-
ferent from that of the unborn is exemplified by the second basic
way in which virtual representation operates, that is, where the
unborn beneficiaries are represented by the holder of the prior
estate. This came into use in the English courts when the first ten-
ant in tail represented the interests of the unborn remaindermen. 9
Under this reasoning, in the trust set up by A to B for life with
the remainder to the children of B, the life tenant would be able
to represent his unborn children as the holder of the prior estate.10
The doctrine of virtual reprsentation would seem then to be
flexible in application and useful in terminating a trust while pro-
viding the unborn heirs with representation in courtY- Based as
it is on the self-interest of the representative and the similarity of
his interests to those of the unborn he represents, virtual represen-
tation should be available in most cases involving a determination
of the rights of unborn where there are living parties with like
interests.
Limitations are placed on the doctrine, but not such as would
impair its flexibility. Thus there is a requirement that "one mem-
ber of the group cannot represent the others in a case where, under
the issue before the court, their interests would be adverse."12 The
similarity of estates between the living representatives and the un-
born merely raises a presumption, which prevails in most cases,
that there is a similarity of interest in the question before the court.
8 Gunnell v. Palmer, 370 MI1. 206, 209, 18 N.E.2d 202, 204 (1938). See Annot.,
120 A.L.R. 876 (1939).
9 RSTATEimNr OF PRoERTY § 184(b) (1936); Roberts, supra note 5, at 584; 5
HASTNGS L. J., supra note 6, at 208.
10 Miller v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 132 US. 662 (1890); Rodgers v. Unborn Child or
Children of Rodgers, 204 Tenn. 96, 315 S.A.2d 521 (1958); RsrATFNtNr or PROPRTY
§ 184(d) (1936); L. SIMES, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FuruRa Jr.Rrs § 49 (2d ed.
1966).
11 Also note that this flexibility may be enhanced in certain drcurmstances where
it is possible to have the trustee represent the unborn. REsrATEmE.,T" or PRorET
§ 186 (1936).
12 L. SniEs & A. S=m, TnE LAw OF FuruaE baRasTs § 1804 (2d ed. 1956).
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This may be rebutted by evidence showing actual adversity to the
interests of the unborn.13 A second requirement is that there be no
fraud or collusion between the representatives and the party seek-
ing to terminate the trust. It is the duty of the court in the first
instance to determine whether these requirements are met and
whether such representation is in the best interests of the unborn.14
II. GuADiAN AD LimM
The second way which the courts, and in this case many state
legislatures, have provided for affecting the interests of the unborn
is by the appointment of a guardian ad litem. Like virtual repre-
sentation the use of the guardian ad litem to represent the interests
of the unborn is not a recent development. 15 It too may be used to
bypass the basic rules standing in the way of trust termination: (1)
that termination is not possible without the consent of all bene-
ficiaries, and (2) that a decree or judgment is not binding on those
interested persons who are not made a party to the proceedings.
The guardian ad litem is a special guardian appointed by the
court to represent a party who is under a disability-here the un-
born beneficiary. 6 He is an officer of the court which appointed him
and is subject to the supervision and control of that court.'1 He is
limited to acting as attorney for the particular persons lie was desig-
nated to represent and to protect and advance the interests of those
18 For example, if the settlor was also the income beneficiary and wished to
terminate the trust he would not be able to represent the unborn heirs even though
he is the holder of a prior estate. His interest in termination would be adverse to
that of the unborn beneficiaries under the trust.
14 Bennett v. Fleming, 105 Ohio St. 852, 187 N.E. 900 (1922). This can also be In-
ferred from RE TATENMNT OF PROPERTY § 185 (1986) and from general language on
adequate representation in Gunnell v. Palmer, 870 Ill. 206, 18 N.E.2d 202 (1958).
See L. Simas & A. SnirrH, THE LAw oF FutuRE INwxasrs § 1804 (2d ed. 1956).
'5 Hatch v. Riggs Natl Bank, 861 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Leonardinl V. Wells
Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 181 Cal. App. 2d 9, 280 P.2d 81 (1955); Mabry v.
Scott, 51 Cal. App. 2d 245, 124 P.2d 659, cert. denied, 817 U.S. 670 (1942); Gunnell
v. Palmer, 370 Ill. 206, 18 N.E.2d 202 (1938); Robinson v. Barrett, 142 Kan. 68, 45
P.2d 587 (1935); Loring v. Hildreth, 170 Mass. 828, 49 N.E. 652 (1898); Deal v.
Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 218 N.C. 488, 11 S.E.2d 464 (1940); In re Wolcott, 95
N.H. 28, 56 A.2d 641 (1948); Franklin v. Margay Oil Corp., 194 Okla. 519, 158 P.2d
486 (1944); Peoples Nat'1 Bank v. Barlow, 235 S.C. 488, 122 S.E.2d 896 (1960);
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 182 (b) (1986).
16 In re Schrier's Estate, 157 Misc. 810, 288 N.Y.S. 283 (Sur. Ct. 1935). See gen-
erally Note, Guardians Ad Litem, 45 IoivA L. REv. 876 (1960).
17 Tyson v. Richardson, 103 Wis. 897, 79 N.W. 489 (1899).
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persons.18 In this capacity he is a fiduciary. The duty to represent
the unborn beneficiaries means that "[t]he representation by the
guardian must be real and not merely formal"; 19 the guardian must
do more than simply file an appearance and give consent to termin-
ation. There must be a showing that it would be in the best inter-
ests of the unborn to terminate the trust, if that is possible, or that
the interests of the unborn under the trust have been replaced by
something equally beneficial, as the result of some settlement or
compromise the settlor or person seeking to terminate the trust has
made with the guardian. Without such a showing the guardian has
no authority to consent to termination.20
Although there has been some question as to the power of a
court to appoint a guardian ad litem without statutory authoriza-
tion,21 the majority view now is that courts have this inherent equity
power.22 Courts have acted in many ways on the interests of the un-
born in property litigation, and there would seem to be little dif-
ference in the effectiveness of representation by a guardian ad litem
whether appointed with or without statutory authority. This ques-
tion has become academic in many states since the enactment of
statutes which do provide for such appointment of guardians ad
litem to represent interests of the unborn or unascertained..2 3 These
18 Wogman v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 123 Cal App. 2d 657, 267
P.2d 423 (1954); Clarke v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 393 Ill. 419, 66 N.E2d 378
(1946); Morgan v. Hamlet, 345 Ill. App. 107, 102 N.E.2d 365 (1951).
19 Leonardini v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 131 Cal. App. 2d 9, 17,
280 P.2d 81, 87 (1955).
20 Deal v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 218 N.C. 483, 11 S.E.2d 464 (1940);
Franklin v. Margay Oil Corp., 194 Okla. 519, 153 P.2d 486 (1944); In re Small's
Estate, 67 York Leg. Rec. 1 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1953).
21 MoxIley v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 154 P.2d 417 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1945),
aff'd, 165 P.2d 15 (1946); McPherson v. First & Citizens Nat'l Bank, 240 N.C. 1, 81
S.E.2d 386 (1954). For a statute enacted shortly after the decision in the Moxley
case see CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 373.5 (WVest 1954).
The RESTATEmNT OF PROPERTY bases its rule on statutory authority only and
expressly makes no committment as to the power of courts to appoint a guardian ad
litem as a matter of the inherent power of the court. RXrSTAT.%mr oF PRorErry §
182, comment on clause (b) (1936).
22 Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Lconardini v. Wells
Fargo Bank & Trust Co., 131 Cal. App. 2d 9, 280 P.2d 81 (1955); Mabry v. Scott, 51
Cal. App. 2d 245, 124 P.2d 659, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 670 (1942); Smith v. Lamb, 103
Ga. App. 157, 118 S.E2d 924 (1961); Gunnell v. Palmer, 370 Ill. 206, 18 N.E.2d 202
(1938); Peoples Natel Bank v. Barlow, 235 S.C. 488, 122 S.E.2d 396 (1960).
23 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 873.5 (West 1954); ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 22, § 6 (1959);
MAss. ANN. LAws, ch. 203, § 17 (1955); MD. R LES PROC., Rule 275 (1961); Aift=
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statutes generally provide the court with power to appoint a disin-
terested third party to defend and protect the interests of the un-
born. They also provide the judgment shall be conclusive on all
persons the guardian ad litem represents.
III. PROTECTING THE UNBORN BENEFICIARIES
It would seem then that both virtual representation and the
appointment of a guardian ad litem could provide the representa-
tion necessary for termination of an irrevocable trust and entry of
a decree binding on the unborn. Virtual representation would be
available in most cases and would be the easiest to apply, since the
representatives are necessary parties to the proceedings. It would
also eliminate the extra cost involved in the appointment of a guard-
ian. But, from the standpoint of protection of the unborn, the ap-
pointment of the guardian ad litem appears to be in their best
interests. While virtual representation is based on the self-interest
of the representative and its similarity to that of the unborn, there
is always the possibility that adverse interest could play a part,
despite the role of the court in screening the representatives. The
guardian ad litem, on the other hand, is a disinterested third party,
usually an attorney, who is selected and closely supervised by the
court. This not only diminishes the possibility of collusion, but
also has the administrative advantage of relieving the court of a
determination as to collusion or adversity in the representative.
The representative under virtual representation is under no
real duty to actively pursue the interests of those he represents.
This stems from the nature of the doctrine itself. Fair representa-
tion requires only that he act in his own self-interest. The interest
of the representative, however, may turn out to be different from
that of the unborn heirs.24 "If the representative fails to adequately
protect the beneficiaries and this is not apparent to the court in
the original suit, the settlement which he makes may be attacked
later and the termination declared ineffective." 25 The guardian ad
STATS. ANN. § 27.3178 (212) (1947). Other state statutes provide for guardians ad litem
in special situations. IOwA CODE ANN., Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 298 (1943) (partition suits);
KAN. STATS. ANN. § 59-2254 (1964) (trust accounting); OKLA. STATS. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 1147.3 (1961) (proceedings to sell real estate); VA. CODE, tit. 8, § 8-703.1 (1950) (sale
or lease of property).
24 Bennett v. Fleming, 105 Ohio St. 352, 137 N.E. 900 (1922); Roberts, stpra
note 5, at 590.
25 Miller v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 132 U.S. 662 (1890); McArthur v. Scott, 113 U.S.
340 (1885); Mortimore v. Bashore, 317 Il. 535, 148 NYE. 817 (1925); Legislation, 48 HARV.
L. REv. 1001, 1003 (1935).
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litem, on the other hand, has a fiduciary duty to the unborn and
may be made personally to respond in damages for any negligence
or failure of representation. 26 When the guardian is appointed pur-
suant to a state statute, settlements approved by the court have
binding effect,27 which means that instead of upsetting the decree
of termination by the court, the subsequent heirs may sue the guard-
ian for breach of his fiduciary duty. Given this personal liability,
the guardian will be unlikely to act in anything but the best inter-
ests of those he represents.
The comparison between virtual representation and the ap-
pointment of the guardian ad litem shows not only the advantages
of the appointment of the guardian, but also that the best way to
safeguard the interests of the unborn and provide for a decree of
binding effect is to always have the extra protection of the guardian
ad litem. Because virtual representation is available in most cases,
it may be used to fall back on if the appointment should fail for
one reason or another.
IV. FINDING A Qum PRO Quo
Once the appointment of the guardian ad litem has been made,
the question becomes one of whether to grant termination of the
trust. The problem at this point is not whether the court may ren-
der a binding decree against the unborn, for that is provided for
in the statutes of many states and is the common law of others. The
heirs who do come into being will sue the guardian ad litem rather
than try to upset a decree under these statutes. But now that the
court has appointed his disinterested third party who may be liable
to his "wards" for failure of representation, the question arises:
Have we effectively sealed off the possibility of termination? It at
once becomes apparent that the answer to this is "yes," except in
a very few cases. It is a foregone conclusion that the guardian ad
litem must receive some sort of quid pro quo in return for his con-
sent to termination. Because of his responsibility to represent the
best interests of the unborn, to merely consent to termination with-
out receiving any consideration would likely be a breach of his
fiduciary duty.28 Moreover, the courts, having close supervisory
powers over the guardian as a court appointee, will not allow it.
26 Dixon v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 798 (W.DS.C. 1961); In re Jaegcr's Will,
218 Wis. 1, 259 N.W. 842 (1935).
27 CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. § 373.5 (West 1949); I. R v. STAT., ch. 22 § 6 (1959).
28 Hatch v. Riggs Nat'I Bank, 361 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Leonardini v. Wells
Fargo Bank & Trust Co., 131 Cal. App. 2d 9, 280 P2d 81 (1955). These two cases
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A guardian ad litem has no authority, without valid con-
sideration, to relinquish the rights of the infant defendents
whom he represents. 29
[I]n the absence of any evidence that the unborn remain-
dermen would be so benefited, the guardian is without power
to consent to direct invasion of the unborn remaindermen's
rights.30
The question then becomes one of finding a satisfactory quid pro
quo which will be acceptable to the guardian ad litem.
Many articles have been written on the possible considerations
to be given in return for modification of the trust agreement or an
invasion of the corpus,3 1 but termination poses a different prob-
lem. With the termination of the trust agreement the entire inter-
est of the beneficiary under the trust is cut off. Thus it would seem
the quid pro quo must be commensurate with the value of the
estate the beneficiary would have received had the trust not been
terminated or presumably the guardian ad litem will not consent
to the agreement. In light of this consideration, some quid pro quos
suggested for modification are not plausible for termination. For
example, if a compromise agreement states that the settlor or other
person wishing to terminate will make some sort of provision in
his will for the unborn contingent remaindermen, there can be
no guarantee any assets will be left in the estate when such person
dies. 3 2 Thus such a solution is not feasible in the termination situa-
tion. If there is only a modification of the trust or an invasion of
the trust corpus, the compromise agreement is still in a sense se-
cured by a concrete sum, the remainder of the trust corpus. In
order for the guardian ad liten to consent to termination, that term-
deal with modification of the trust agreement. Cases dealing with termination are
Wogman v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 657, 267 P.2d 423
(1954), and Deal v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 218 N.C. 483, 11 S.E.2d 464 (1940).
29 Deal v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 218 N.C. 483, 491, 11 S.E.2d 464, 468 (1940).
30 Leonardini v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 131 Cal. App. 2d 9, 17,
280 P.2d 81, 87 (1955); see G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusTMs § 1007 (2d ed. 1962).
For a good discussion of duties and responsibilities see In re Small's Estate, 67 York
Leg. Rec. 1 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1953).
81 66 COLUM. L. Rav. 1552 (1966); 42 NomE DAMiE LAwYER 542 (1967); 42 WAsl.
L. REv. 919 (1967).
32 Another possible consideration for modification of a trust is the abandonment
of a suit which will possibly result in a decree declaring the trust invalid. Mabry v.
Scott, 51 Cal. App. 2d 245, 124 P.2d 659, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 670 (1942); Hardy v,
Bankers Trust Co., 137 NJ.Eq. 352, 44 A.2d 839 (Ch. 1945). In re Small's Estate,
67 York Leg. Rec. 1 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1953).
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ination agreement must also be secured by some sort of assured
provision for the remaindermen. The logical place from which this
provision would come is the trust corpus, which brings the interest
of the guardian into conflict with that of the settlor wishing to
terminate and regain the corpus. Such conflict places yet another
impediment in the way of termination. Because of lack of standards
or criteria for determining whether a certain quid pro quo is bene-
ficial to the unborn, and because of the possibility that he may have
to answer to the persons coming into being who are not satisfied
with the agreement, the guardian ad litem is likely to be very con-
servative in giving his consent to any termination agreement.
If the settlor has set up a trust giving himself a power of ap-
pointment by which he can dispose of the assets in the trust corpus
as he chooses, he may have a fairly strong bargaining position to
use against the guardian ad litem.3 3 In such a case the interest of
the unborn heirs is "doubly contingent" in that they will take only
if (1) they come into being and (2) the settlor does not exercise
his power of appointment thereby ending all their interest under
the trust instrument. Here there is definitely good consideration for
consent to modification of the trust agreement. In return for the
invasion of the trust corpus the settlor releases his power of ap-
pointment and makes the interest of the unborn certain to vest if
they come into being. 34
The same may be true in the case of termination of a trust
where the settlor has reserved a power of appointment. Certainly
the mere release of the power could not be consideration if the
trust were terminated. If, however, the settlor set up some sort of
trust fund for the unborn while at the same time releasing the power
of appointment, the guardian ad litem and the settlor might be
able to make a compromise agreement and the trust terminated. The
interest of the unborn beneficiaries in the new fund which was set
up would be decreased in monetary value, but it would now be
certain to vest if they came into being.
But when the person seeking termination of the trust holds no
power of appointment the possibilities of compromise are greatly
diminished, if not completely erased. For example, A sets up a trust
with income to himself for life and remainder to his children. A
wishes then to terminate the trust at a time when he has one child,
and for that purpose a guardian ad litem is appointed to represent
83 Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 361 F2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
34 Id.
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the unborn children of A. The guardian will not consent to the
termination because there is no consideration which A could give
that would be in the best interests of the unborn.35 A could set up
a separate trust fund for the benefit of the unborn; but logically
he cannot, or will not, do this if his attempt, to terminate is moti-
vated by a desire to take back the trust corpus. Since the only con-
tingency on the interest of unborn beneficiaries is that of coming
into being, the amount contained in the compromise trust would
have to be as great as in the one terminated, and A would have
gained nothing. If the settlor was only willing to offer something
less than the amount which the unborn would receive under the
existing trust, which would seem logical, the guardian ad litem
would consider it best to wait for the possible birth of issue and
not consent to termination. The situation then is a stalemate, with
the result that the trust will continue until the interest has vested
in possession or the meeting of the contingency has become an im-
possibility.
V. USE OF THE REFUNDING BOND
The Pennsylvania courts have found an answer to this stale-
mate, or at least it has been suggested that it may be the answer.80
A refunding bond is given to the trustee by those persons taking
distributive shares of the corpus on termination. The bond is given
upon the condition that the distributees will refund that portion of
the distribution they have received if a person who has an interest
comes into being. The settlor attempting to terminate the trust
would take the corpus and in return give a refunding bond to the
trustee. If remaindermen come into being the settlor refunds the
corpus and the remaindermen take the shares to which they are en-
titled.
But is this really the answer to the problem of furnishing con-
sideration for consent to termination? The Pennsylvania courts have
confined the use of this bond to cases in which there was only a re-
mote chance of newborn remaindermen and where the trust had all
but dried up.37 This would seem to be the only possible situation
35 It would not be unusual for the guardian to object to termination In this
situation. Liberty Trust Co. v. Weber, 200 Md. 491, 90 A.2d 194, modified, 200 Md.
491, 523, 91 A.2d 393 (1952). See also Duffy v. Duffy, 221 N.C. 521, 20 S.E.2d 85
(1942).
86 Bowen Estate, 3 Pa. D. & C. 2d 401 (Orphans' Ct. 1955).
37 Id.
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in which to use this type of consideration. If it were used in a case
where there was a good or even fair chance that remaindermen
would come into being the trust would in most cases not be termi-
nated, but merely held in abeyance for a generation or two until
remaindermen were born. Furthermore, its use by the Pennsylvania
courts only where there is not a great likelihood of new remainder-
men suggests that the costs of such a bond might be prohibitive if
used in a case in which there was a good or fair chance of remainder-
men. Thus the expectations of the settlor who is terminating the
trust would certainly be defeated. In the end most of the trust corpus
would be consumed in procuring the bond and there would be no
reason to terminate.
VI. PROBLEIVS OF TERMINATION
The prospects for termination seem dim where the settlor, or
even the life beneficiary, wishes to terminate the trust and there re-
mains the possibility of unborn heirs. The guardian ad litem, in his
fiduciary capacity, is necessarily limited in the kinds of compromise
agreements he may make. At the same time the settlor is motivated
by the desire to regain as much of the trust corpus as he possibly
can. Given these two forces there seems to be no possible way to re-
solve the resulting stalemate.
The possibilities for termination are no better under the doc-
trine of virtual representation. The representatives may not bind
unborn heirs to any compromise agreement which is not in the best
interests of the unborn, and thus there is always the possibility of a
later attack by heirs who come into being and feel that their in-
terests were not adequately protected in the original suit.3 8 If termi-
nation is no easier under virtual representation, the guardian ad
litem should be preferred because of the advantage of additional
safeguards to the interests of the unborn. But the appointment of
the guardian ad litem is not, as may be thought, a way to promote
alienability and flexibility in trusts. The guardian is appointed to
protect the interests of unborn heirs to whom some kind of estate
is limited (and the same is true for virtual representation). He can-
not protect their interests by merely consenting to termination with
little or no consideration. This means that there is an inability of
the guardian ad litem to compromise his position.
This improbability of termination is very much in accord with
the basic rules of trust law. Where the settlor has shown an original
8 See note 25 supra.
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intent to benefit those named in the trust agreement, he cannot sub-
sequently change that intent and revoke the interest which he has
given without consent of the beneficiaries.80 So it is also with a gift.
The donor cannot revoke a gift after delivery and acceptance merely
because he has changed his mind and wishes its return. The rules
which allow termination prior to fulfillment of the purpose of the
trust, such as unforeseen and material changes of circumstances or
a merger of interests, are designed to further effectuate the intent
of the settlor or bring the trust agreement into focus with the reali-
ties of the situation. If the settlor and all the beneficiaries agree to
the termination, there is no reason to interpret his original intent
and the trust may be terminated. Despite his subsequent intent, how-
ever, the settlor cannot revoke the interest of the unborn and the
guardian ad litem is appointed to see that there is no consent with-
out consideration. This means that the trust will be terminated in
very few cases.
In some ways such a result seems harsh to a settlor who has set
up the trust primarily for his own benefit or who has unknowingly
set up an irrevocable trust with a remainder limited to his heirs, and
who now desires to terminate. Given the existing situation there is
little he can do to terminate the trust. In some states provisions have
been made by courts and legislatures for termination without the
consent of the unborn and, although limited in scope, they may pro.
vide ways to somewhat alleviate the problem.
VII. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Many state statutes provide that the settlor may revoke or
terminate the trust where the trust was not expressly made irrevoc-
able, even though no express power of revocation was reserved. 40
The settlor and all beneficiaries must consent to this termination,
but the class of beneficiaries is limited to those in being at the time
of the proposed termination. A statute providing that irrevocable
trusts may be terminated will probably not be forthcoming because
of many factors, among them the express intent of the settlor and V
the federal income tax laws. The statutes now in force, however, do
relieve some of the problems with regard to termination.
39 See note 1 supra.
40 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2280 (West 1954); MD. ANN. CODE, art. 16, § 108 (1957;
N.C. GEN. STATS. § 39-6 (1966); N.Y. PEas. PROP. LAW § 23 (McKinney 1962); Oi'iA, STATS.
ANN. tit. 60, § 175.41 (1963); TEx. Rxv. STATS. ANN., art. 7425b-41 (1960); see G. BooaRT,
TRUSTS AND TRuSrEES § 999 (2d ed. 1962).
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Following the general principles behind these statutes it may
be possible for the courts to expand upon the solutions which can
properly be used in negotiating the termination of a trust. As many
states have done already, the parties might be permitted to bring in
evidence as to the physical impossibility of child-bearing.4' The rule
of the possibility of unborn heirs would then become a rebuttable
presumption and, if rebutted successfully, there would be no need
for representation of any kind.
In certain cases it might also be possible for the court to play- a
greater role in looking into the intent of the settlor. For example,
if a decedent set up a trust with income to his widow for life and
the remainder to her children and the trust was not providing her
with sufficient income, the court would look at the intent of the
settlor to provide mainly for the widow and to benefit the children
with the remainder only to the extent that funds were not needed
for the widow. 42 The court should be able to look more extensively
into, or speculate as to, the settlor's intent and determine whether
that intent would be best served by termination. In this situation
it would be in the best interests of the unborn to have the guardian
ad litem object and wait for the possibility of issue.48 But it can be
argued that the role of the guardian ad litem is not or should not
be one of merely objecting to termination. Perhaps the only real re-
quirement to making a decree which would bind the unborn heirs
is that a guardian be appointed to actively contest the termination.
He is perhaps not intended to stand in the way of termination but
merely provide the court with an active contest of the interests of
the unborn before any action is taken. The court would then have
greater leeway in considering the equities on the side of the life
beneficiary who wishes to terminate the trust for need of extra in-
come or for other reasons. This takes away some of the obstructive
effect of the guardian ad litem while preserving the interests of the
unborn through advocacy proceedings. This gives the court oppor-
tunity to take both sides into account and render a more flexible
and equitable decree as to all parties involved.
Giving the court this greater role of delving into the intent of
41 In re Bassett's Estate, 104 N.H. 504, 190 A.2d 415 (1963); see 98 A.L.RI2d 1285
(1964). But see, e.g., P. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 41 Del. Chs. 109, 188 A.2d 361 (Ch.
1962).
42 This is done already in some situations. In re Wolcott, 95 N..-L 23, 56 A2d
641 (1948). Note also that it is in this situation that the Pennsylvania courts have
used the refunding bond. Bowen's Estate, 3 Pa. D. & C. 2d 401 (Orphans' CL 1955).
4s See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
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the settlor would certainly not provide a panacea for the problems
of termination, but it would solve termination in some cases, par-
ticularly of the type just discussed. At the same time the court would
not be depriving the unborn heirs of anything the settlor intended
them to have, since it is working with the true intent of the settlor
at the time he set up the trust and merely correcting his misappre-
hension as to the extent of his wealth. The unborn heirs would be
bound by the judgment of the court, but not before their position
had been fully vocalized by the advocacy of the guardian ad litem.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Under present law, the termination of a trust agreement by the
settlor is not likely when there is the possibility of unborn heirs. The
interests of the unborn require protection, whether that protection
is given by virtual representation or the appointment of a guardian
ad litem. But the interposing of these representatives to protect the
unborn is the very thing which prevents termination altogether.
Under virtual representation there is no real assurance of adequate
protection for the unborn and because of this the decree may be
later attacked by the unborn who come into being. The appointment
of a guardian ad litem, while affording adequate protection, almost
completely blocks any chance of termination, even in cases where
the equities of the situation are in favor of termination. Due to his
personal responsibility and court supervision the guardian ad litem
has little chance to compromise his position. The inequity of this
can be seen especially in cases, such as that discussed, of the needy
life beneficiary. Particularly in that situation something is needed
to reduce the inflexibility of the guardian's position.
The possibilities suggested in section VII do not by any means
provide the complete answer to the problem of termination. They
allow, however, termination where it is warranted by the circum-
stances of each case, and they ameliorate the rigidity which seems to
be characteristic of the position of the guardian ad litem, a rigidity
which leads one to question why, if the duty of the guardian ad
litem were merely to object, we could not simply do away with the
guardian and have a rule of law prohibiting trust termination when
there is a possibility of unborn heirs. The interests of the unborn
must be balanced against the interests of the settlor and the remain-
ing beneficiaries who wish to terminate the trust. Under the present
structure the interests of the latter cannot be readily accommodated.
In many cases the situation warrants a compromise of the interests
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of the unborn. The suggestions outlined in Section VII propose a
possible way to accomplish this compromise without doing injustice
to those interests.
Allen D. Clark
